An open dialogue between the protesters and the Sudanese army could pull Sudan from the brink of failed statehood.
They fired tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition in an attempt to disperse the sit-in. Snipers from a building across the street were also targeting the protesters.
Mass casualties were only avoided due to the intervention from the military, who ushered protesters into the army’s headquarters compound. They also engaged in a firefight with the attacking security contingent and allied militias. By Tuesday, the total number of casualties had reached 14, five of them soldiers.
That was a turning point in the four-months-old protests that erupted on December 19 last year, presenting the most serious threat yet to the regime of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The bloody confrontation represented a point of no return for both the regime and its challengers.
The protesters had made their first breakthrough, managing to amass the largest protest yet, and succeeding in encircling the army HQ. The move was purposefully planned to coincide with the 34th anniversary of the overthrow of the military regime of former President Gaafar Nimeiri on
April 6, 1985.
The protesters’ success in occupying and holding territory in the capital was significant on its own, as earlier attempts to organise sit-ins had been brutally and swiftly crushed by the security forces.
The combined symbolism of the event and the site, together with the brutal (if abortive) crackdown, tested the regime and revealed cracks in its edifice. The military, especially the young officers manning the barricades, have shown open sympathy with the protesters, and readiness to fight
and die protecting them.
This was ominous, since such an unpopular regime could not last a day without army support. It is true that the top army leadership was quick to dismiss reports of a rift, and pledged allegiance to the regime. A high-level security meeting on the eve of the attempted crackdown resulted in a
stern warning that the army would not permit the country to “slip into chaos”.
This was a clear warning of the very crackdown that followed, and a declaration that the army would back it. The regime thus made it clear that it would stop at nothing in its quest to hang on to power. Those holding the balance within the army appeared to be backing it. But it is not yet
known for how long.
If this course of action is maintained, the outcome is easily predictable. Massacres would be perpetrated, followed by fragmentation of the military, then the country. We have seen this in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Chad, Liberia, etc.
Sudan, which already has about five ongoing civil conflicts, is a more likely candidate for state failure than many.
When the Fragile State Index (previously Failed State Index) was launched by the Fund for Peace in 2006, Sudan occupied the first spot on the list for two consecutive years, never going below third place through 2013. This year, it is number 8. However, that classification reflects negatively
on the validity of the Index.
The years from 2005 to 2010 were, in fact, a period of surprising stability, regardless of the disastrous war in Darfur. Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, and the achievement of high levels of oil production at good world prices, the country witnessed an unprecedented level of prosperity and political stability.
