If the African Union delays its decision to reinstate Sudan, it would harm the soon to be formed civilian government.
On August 4, Sudan’s ruling generals and protest leaders initialled a constitutional declaration that paves the way for a transition to civilian rule. The ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC), which seized power following the toppling of longtime President Omar al-Bashir in April, and the
Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition are expected to formally sign the declaration in front of foreign dignitaries on August 17 in Khartoum.
The transitional period, which will begin on that day and which is expected to last 39 months, will see the dissolution of the TMC, the establishment of a 11-member sovereign council in its place (which will have five military members selected by the TMC and five civilian members selected by
the FFC, as well as an 11th civilian member chosen by consensus between the two parties) and the subsequent appointment of a prime minister and a cabinet. The constitutional declaration also stipulates the formation of an independent transitional legislative council.
Under agreed timelines, the cabinet and sovereign council should be up and running by the beginning of September, and the legislative council should follow suit before the end of November.
The declaration, which incorporates significant institutional reforms that aim to fundamentally alter the military-civilian balance of power in the country, was hailed by most international observers as the Sudanese people’s long-awaited victory over its military rulers – an achievement that
could potentially kickstart Sudan’s return to normalcy following months of protests and violence.
Amid these events, the question arises of whether the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in early June, days after the military launched a brutal crackdown on protests, should reinstate it.
By lifting Sudan’s suspension and welcoming the country back into the African political scene, the regional body could inject confidence to the transitional government and speed up the normalisation process in the country. But is it time for the AU to lift the suspension? Are we really
witnessing the beginning of a civilian-controlled transition in Sudan?
Sudan’s long-awaited and hard-won constitutional declaration includes several pleasant surprises for the supporters of the country’s pro-democracy movement, with the emergence of a powerful cabinet being the most significant one. According to the declaration, an FFC-selected prime
minister will name a cabinet of 20 ministers from a list of nominees selected once again by the FFC, excluding the interior and defence ministers. The latter two will be appointed by the military members on the sovereign council. Perhaps most importantly, the cabinet will be accountable not
to the sovereign council, but to the civilian legislative council.
Overall, the logic of division of powers will follow a parliamentary system of government such that the sovereign council will function as a largely ceremonial head of state, while the civilian cabinet will enjoy plenary executive functions.
This is a surprising outcome considering that the negotiation process had excessively focused on the composition and powers of the sovereign council. Under the declaration, the sovereign council’s principal function is limited to formally confirming a slew of appointments. It does not even
hold the power to block these appointments, as the constitutional declaration clearly states that they will take effect within 15 days anyway.
Even its power to declare an emergency or war is subject to the ratification of the transitional legislative council, which would have 67 percent of its members appointed by the FFC, with the remaining 33 percent selected by groups unlikely to be sympathetic to the military.
Moreover, the power of the sovereign council to sign international agreements is subject to the ratification of the legislative council. This could have serious implications when it comes to the deployment of Sudanese military forces abroad, or the presence of foreign forces in Sudan, as such
deployments would normally require bilateral agreements between the involved states.
Also surprisingly, while the declaration foresees the immunity from criminal processes of members of the sovereign council (as well as cabinet, the transitional legislative council and governors of provinces), it can be lifted by a simple majority in the legislative council. This provision
empowers civilians vis-a-vis the military.
The only notable power the sovereign council has under this new arrangement is the authority to “sponsor” the peace process with armed groups. Nevertheless, any such process should also involve the cabinet, as it is mandated to work towards stopping wars and conflict and building peace.
Beyond civilian-military relations, the constitutional de
